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1997 FIU Cuba Poll

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1997 FIU/CUBA POLL

IPOR
Florida International University
Institute for Public Opinion Research

1997 FIU Cuba Poll

Click here for report summarizing survey results.

Click here for comparison with past years results on three issues.

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Revised July 21, 1997 by Hugh Gladwin

Draft -- subject to revision

FIU 1997 CUBA POLL

Guillermo J. Grenier

Hugh Gladwin

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1997 Cuba Poll, conducted by the Institute of Public Opinion Research (IPOR) of Florida International University and the Miami Herald, measured the level of support within the Cuban-American community in Dade County for policies directed toward Cuba. This poll, conducted between May 30 and June 14, 1997 consisted of 1200 random interviews with Cuban Americans in the Dade County area. The size of the poll permits a complete analysis of various demographic categories within the Cuban community Dade County.

The first Cuba Poll was conducted six years ago, in March of 1991. Subsequent polls were conducted in October of 1991, in June of 1993 and March of 1995. As in the three previous polls, the researchers found a diversity of opinions on what policies would facilitate political changes on the island. The consistency of some of the responses, as well as the shift in others, present us with the most complete picture to date of the Cuban-American political attitudes towards Cuba. While most of the responses were consistent with the previous surveys, the most recent poll uncovered interesting shifts in some significant attitudes toward foreign policy options as well as highlighted some important opinions regarding the Helms-Burton Act and of the importance of foreign policy for domestic decision making. In general terms, the findings can be summarized as follows.

There appears to be an increasing frustration about the lack of political change occurring on the island and the growing realization that desired changes are not likely to occur anytime soon. Only 11% of respondent feel that changes will occur within one year.

At the same time, over fifty one percent (51.6%) of respondents signal that they would support a dialogue with the Cuban government. In the context of the other responses, this desire can be interpreted as signifying that among some within the Cuban-American community in Dade County, a dialogue is seen as an agent of positive change as well as a way to bring about the end of the Castro era in Cuba.

Cuban Americans feel that they are well informed about the Helms-Burton Act and overwhelmingly support its major initiatives. Only 15% respond that they have not heard much about the law. Over 75% think that it is a good way to bring about change on the island.

The Cuban American residents of Dade County are generally concerned about the lack of change on the island but they are far from monolithic in their support for different policies. There are major differences of opinion and a number of these vary systematically across different groups in the community. For example, respondents who left Cuba after 1979 are more likely to support negotiated solutions than those arriving during the 1960s. In fact, the more recent the departure from Cuba, the more likely that the respondent will support negotiated solutions.

Although only 25% feel that the embargo has worked well, the Cuban American population expressed

strong support for its continuation (78%) and increasing international economic pressure in form of punishment of foreign companies doing business on the island (70%). Over 61% of the respondents support the prohibition on U.S. companies from doing business in Cuba. Approximately 79% favor the possibility of suing companies for seized property.

Yet, 56% would favor allowing companies to sell medicine to the people on the island.

Echoing the results of the other surveys, the Cuban-American community is willing to lend support to human rights groups working inside Cuba. Over 92% of respondents support lending a hand to such groups.

Nearly 77% of the respondents feel that the number of visas currently being given to Cubans on the island to come to the United States to live is adequate.

Only 6% of the respondents consider themselves active members of an organization working directly on issues relating to Cuba.

There continues to be support for initiating military action by exile groups (71%) or a U.S. invasion of the island (66%).

While the community supports travel to the island to visit relatives (70%), it does not approve of allowing travel just for the sake of visiting the island. Approximately 77% think that such travel should not be allowed.

A large majority of respondents (70%) report that a local candidate's position on Cuba is important in determining their vote.

A large majority (71%) feels that all points of view on how to deal with Castro are not being heard in Miami.

FINDINGS

ANTICIPATION OF POLITICAL CHANGES IN CUBA

The survey results indicate that Cuban-Americans have become less certain about when major political changes will occur in Cuba. While in 1991 and 1995 approximately 88% and 41%, respectively, of respondents expected changes to occur within five years or less, only 36% of the current respondents expect major changes within the next five years.

Only 11 percent expect major political changes to occur in Cuba within one year while an additional 25 percent anticipate that major changes are more than one year but less than five years away.

17% of the sample believes that desired changes will never occur in Cuba.

The older respondents are more likely to consider political changes in Cuba imminent (within one year). Yet, younger respondents are more optimistic that change will occur within the next nine years. Similarly, significantly more respondents who oppose a dialogue believe that changes will occur within one year but more of those favoring a dialogue believe that changes will occur within two to five years.

POLICIES SUPPORTED TO PROMOTE POLITICAL CHANGE IN CUBA

The Cuban-American community supports a variety of policies to promote political changes on the island. Within the general patterns there are some variances associated with particular groups. The cross tabulations included in this report divide responses according to seven variables: gender, age, year respondent left Cuba, education, income level, position on a dialogue with the Cuban government and political party affiliation. Please refer to these tabulations for complete details on the differences between respondents belonging to each group. Here, we will highlight the general responses of the populations based on their level of support for specific policies. If we look at the rank order of support from the all of the respondents that voiced an opinion, the following order emerges.

92 percent favor supporting human rights groups working inside Cuba.

71 percent favor military action by the exile community against the Cuban government.

70 percent favor allowing travel to the island to visit relatives.

66 percent favor United States military action to overthrow Cuban government.

56 percent favor allowing companies to sell medicine to the island.

52 percent favor the establishment of a national dialogue between Cuban exiles, Cuban dissidents, and representatives of the Cuban Government.

44 percent favor allowing U.S. companies to sell food to the island.

23 percent favor allowing travel to the island just to visit.

CHANGES IN PERSONAL PLANS IF CUBA'S GOVERNMENT CHANGES TO A DESIRED DEMOCRACY

Another set of questions were designed to measure the potential movement of Cubans between Miami and the island when certain changes are perceived to have taken place in Cuban.

23 percent would be very likely (11%) or somewhat likely (11.6%)to return to live on the island if the country's economy improved significantly.

29 percent would be very likely (14.3%) or somewhat likely (15%) to return to live on the island if the country's government changed to a democratic form.

49 percent would be very likely (28%) or somewhat likely (16.6%) to return to live on the island if the economy and the government changed for the better.

36 percent felt that relatives on the island would come to the United States to live if Cuba had a democratic government.

ON THE ISSUE OF A DIALOGUE

Perhaps the most discussed division within the Cuban-American community in the United States is that between those who support a dialogue among all Cubans and the Cuban government to expedite changes on the island and those who oppose such a dialogue. Excluding the respondents who did not answer the question or did not know if they would support such and initiative, 51.6% of the respondents favor the establishment of such a national dialogue.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION USED BY RESPONDENTS

Another set of questions measured the primary source of information used by the respondents to receive news about Cuba.

52 percent receive information about Cuba from some television source.

20 percent depend on newspapers for their primary source of information about Cuba.

21 percent listen to the radio for information about Cuba.

Others received most of their information from friends (5%).

Other Media Questions

53 percent of the respondents prefer to receive their news in Spanish and 22 percent prefer news in English and 25 percent prefer both.

55 percent believe that it is a good idea for CNN to open a bureau in Havana.

56 percent believe that it is a good idea for the Herald to open a news bureau in Havana.

Domestic Spill Over Effect

One section of the questionnaire is designed to measure some of the impact that the Cuba issue might have on domestic electoral concerns. One of the most significant results of the domestic spill over effect of the Cuban-American communities' concern with Cuba is their high registration in the Republican Party. About 68 percent of the respondents are U.S. citizens. Of these, 92 percent report being registered to vote. And of these, 70 percent are registered in the Republican Party, 16 percent are registered Democrats and 14 percent are Independents. Analysts have signaled this political alignment, not typical of the Hispanic population in the United States, to be a result of the Cuban concern for foreign policy issues. Cubans became involved in politics initially to influence Washington's position towards Cuba. Achieving local power is a result of this initial commitment.

The polls discern some other dimensions of the spill-over effect on Cuban-American political culture.

Seventy percent say that in local political elections, a candidate's position on Cuba is important in determining their vote.

Seventy one percent feel that all points of view on how to deal with Castro are not being heard in Miami.

Forty one percent are in agreement with the decision to exclude Andy Montanez from the Calle Ocho festival.

Forty seven percent agree with the decision by some stations to stop broadcasting Cuban (from the island) music on local radio stations.

A majority (53%) feel that their opinion, whatever it was, reflects the view of most of the Cuban-American community in Dade County.

The Helms-Burton Act

Fifty six percent of the sample has heard a great deal about the Helms-Burton Law.

Seventy Five percent of the sample feels that the H-B Law is a good idea to bring around change in Cuba.

Seventy three percent feel that the U.S. Congress (and not the President), should decide when to end the embargo against Cuba.

When asked to choose between free elections or a free market system being put in place first, 49 percent of the sample said that free elections are more important than a free market economy.

Fifty one percent of the sample said that the U.S. should be very involved in the development of a Post Castro Cuba. 35 percent said that the U.S. should be somewhat involved.

OTHER OPINIONS

Forty two percent of the sample believes that the next president of Cuba after Fidel should be someone living on the island now.

Fifty two percent of the sample believes that the up coming visit by the Pope to the island will not bring about any significant changes.

Fifty five percent feel that the recent changes in immigration and welfare laws which have caused a number of legal residents to lose government benefits were not necessary.

METHODOLOGY (PRELIMINARY NOTES)

From May 30 to June 14, 1,200 Cuban-Americans in Dade County, Florida were asked a series of questions about their support of policies toward Cuba.

A random sample was generated from telephone exchanges in Dade County using standard random-digit-dialing procedures which ensure that each residential phone has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. The sample was stratified by the 1990 census estimates of number of residents of Cuban descent. Bilingual (Spanish/English) interviewers conducted the interviews from IPOR'S telephone lab at the North Campus of Florida International University. The margin of error for the full sample of

1,200 is +/- 3% at the 95% confidence level.

About half of the sample were people who came to the United States from Cuba before 1970. 16% (189) arrived in the 1980's and 15% (176) in the 1990's. For these latter two groups the margin of error is between +/- 7 and 8 percent; this is precise enough to make many of the differences in opinion between these groups statistically significant.

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS

Dr. Guillermo J. Grenier is Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology and Director of the Center for Labor Research and Studies at Florida International University. Dr. Hugh Gladwin is Director of the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IPOR) at FIU and Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology. The authors thank the IPOR's staff and interviewers for their skill and dedication.

Comparison with past polls on three questions

WHEN WILL MAJOR POLITICAL CHANGE OCCUR?

	March 1991		October 1991		June 1993		March 1995		June 1997	
Within 1 year	166	28%	283	47%	169	28%	152	15%	127	11%
in 2 to 5 years	208	35%	179	30%	175	29%	262	26%	299	25%
in 6 to 10 year	28	5%	21	3%	27	4%	87	9%	170	14%
over ten years	19	3%	13	2%	22	4%	45	4%	128	11%
never	51	9%	26	4%	50	8%	181	18%	199	17%
don't know/nr	128	21%	82	14%	158	26%	274	27%	277	23%
total +/- margin of error	600	+-4%	604	+-4%	601	+-4%	1001	+-3%	1200	+-3%

ESTABLISH NATIONAL DIALOG?

	March 1991		October 1991		June 1993		March 1995		June 1997	
favor	213	36%	279	46%	237	39%	365	36%	579	48%
oppose	322	54%	287	48%	314	52%	538	54%	544	45%
don't know/nr	65	11%	38	6%	50	8%	98	10%	77	6
total +/- margin of error	600	+-4%	604	+-4%	601	+-4%	1001	+-3%	1200	+-3%

(note that a different question was asked 1991-95)

	TIGHTEN		TRADE				EMBARGO		FAVOR CONTINUING TRADE EMBARGO	
	March 1991		October 1991		June 1993		March 1995		June 1997	
favor	419	70%	498	82%	480	80%	801	80%	863	72%
oppose	131	22%	74	12%	86	14%	160	16%	241	20%
don't know/nr	50	8%	32	5%	35	6%	40	4%	96	8%
total +/- margin of error	600	+-4%	604	+-4%	601	+-4%	1001	+-3%	1200	+-3%

Opinions of different waves of immigrants from Cuba.



Year left Cuba

One of the most important ways the Cuban community in Dade County differs is by the years when the largest groups of people came to Dade County. The beginning and end of the 1960's decade saw large numbers arriving, with somewhat fewer in the middle years. Immigration during the 1970's was much less, followed by the Mariel group in 1980. The numbers diminished again until after the early 1990's.

To place these groups in to categories where there are enough responses to analyze, it was necessary to use years when immigration was low as the category boundary. Thus everyone who left Cuba in the years 1975-1984 are in one category, even though most arrived in 1980.

Age distributions for each group

BEFORE 1960



Age distribution for people who gave the year when they came from Cuba as being before 1960.

1960-1964



1965-1974



1975-1984


Histogram
Frequency
Age
Std. Dev = 15.79
Mean = 48.6
N = 198.00

AFTER 1984


Histogram
Frequency
Age
Std. Dev = 16.35
Mean = 41.4
N = 212.00

BORN IN THE UNITED STATES



Opinion questions

The survey asks a large number of questions on what Cubans in Dade County think policy toward Cuba s look at how the different groups by year of immigration answer the question. It must be emphasized that, differences, they are usually matters of degree rather than completely opposing views. On most questions groups agree on wanting vigorous action to bring about change in Cuba. Where they differ it is on how m support the action. On a number of questions there are large segments of some groups which disagree wi policy, and in a few cases those who disagree form a majority in the group.

For clarity in the graphs the responses to each question are grouped to count the number favoring the pol opposed. Counts and percentages for all categories can be found at this site.

The first question analyzed below is on when people think political change will occur in Cuba. Responses those who feel change won't take place for at least five years and those who think it might. Next are the c

U.S. policies and approaches to Cuba. There are 13 such questions, many covering related issues; we nee set of distinct underlying issues. We looked at correlations and crosstabs between pairs of questions, and exploratory factor analysis Click here to see some of this work. This led us to select three questions as m three major distinct issues.

- *3. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba...Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly opp oppose this?* This question best represents responses having to do with measures to deny the Cuba legitimacy as the sole source of solutions to problems in Cuba: if the government can buy food it g with food problems on its own terms.
- *5. Supporting military action by the exile community to overthrow the Cuban Government...Do yo mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?* This question covers the dimension of seein external force to change things in Cuba.
- *12. ... penalizing private companies from other countries which conduct business in Cuba, do you mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?* This question is related to the need to maint the process of economic pressure on Cuba.

Following these there are a number of other questions on more specfic issue.

WHEN WILL POLITICAL CHANGE TAKE PLACE IN CUBA?



This table shows the number of respondents who think it will be more than five years until major political place in Cuba vs. those who think it will happen sooner.

This is the full question: *Over the past few years, people have been talking about the possibility of politi When do you think that major political changes are likely to occur in Cuba? Would you say within one y years, in six to ten years, over ten years, or never?*

Allow US companies to sell food in Cu



Support exile military action to overthrov Castro government.




Favor continuing embargo.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
before 1960
1960-1964
1965-1974
1975-1984
after 1984
born in US
Year came to US from Cuba
fav
op

Penalize foreign companies doing busine in Cuba.



Helms-Burton is good way to bring abou change in Cuba.



President after Fidel/Raul should be pers now living in Cuba.



Should have allowed both music perfor



Voters: Clinton vs. Dole.



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1997 FIU Cuba Poll: Notes on reading tables

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For each question in the poll the following information is given. First, the text of the question. Second, frequency tables. There are two important percentage columns in the frequency tables. The column titled "Percent" is the percentage out of all respondents for that answer. In this column people who refused to answer or said they did not know the answer are included in the total for which this percentage is calculated. The column "Valid Percent" is a percentage based on the respondents who had an opinion about the question; that total excludes the people who had no opinion or did not answer the question.

Following the frequency tables is the third part for each question, the crosstabs tables. These are done with two opinion questions and a number of demographics.

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Revised July 17, 1997 by Hugh Gladwin

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		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*WITHIN ONE YEAR?*	127	10.6	13.8	13.8
	IN TWO TO FIVE YEARS	299	24.9	32.4	46.2
	IN SIX TO TEN YEARS?	170	14.2	18.4	64.6
	OVER TEN YEARS?	128	10.7	13.9	78.4
	OR NEVER?	199	16.6	21.6	100.0
	Total	923	76.9	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW*	252	21.0		
	DON'T CARE /DON'T WANT TO RESPOND	25	2.1		
	Total	277	23.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

When will major political change occur

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
1. When will major political change occur?	*WITHIN ONE YEAR?*	16%	11%	12%	18%	2%	7%	20%	23%
	IN TWO TO FIVE YEARS	34%	33%	32%	33%	31%	33%	32%	33%
	IN SIX TO TEN YEARS?	16%	21%	19%	17%	35%	22%	9%	13%
	OVER TEN YEARS?	11%	15%	14%	12%	17%	20%	10%	9%
	OR NEVER?	22%	19%	22%	20%	15%	17%	29%	22%

Tables

When will major political change occur

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
1. When will major political change occur?	*WITHIN ONE YEAR?*	13%	14%	27%	10%	23%	15%	20%	18%	10%
	IN TWO TO FIVE YEARS	37%	29%	28%	34%	27%	35%	31%	34%	28%
	IN SIX TO TEN YEARS?	23%	16%	10%	21%	13%	13%	15%	19%	14%
	OVER TEN YEARS?	12%	15%	10%	15%	15%	11%	18%	8%	19%
	OR NEVER?	16%	25%	24%	21%	23%	26%	16%	21%	28%

Tables

When will major political change occur

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
1. When will major political change occur?	*WITHIN ONE YEAR?*	13%	16%	14%	12%	21%	11%	6%
	IN TWO TO FIVE YEARS	34%	28%	31%	47%	31%	31%	38%
	IN SIX TO TEN YEARS?	21%	12%	19%	12%	12%	19%	28%
	OVER TEN YEARS?	13%	15%	14%	12%	13%	16%	15%
	OR NEVER?	19%	28%	22%	16%	23%	23%	13%

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2. Allow companies to sell medicine

2. En el pasado, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y la comunidad cubana en el exilio, han apoyado diferentes medidas hacia Cuba. Yo le voy a leer a Ud. algunas de las que se han propuesto y quisiera que Ud. me dijera si las favorece o se opone a ellas. Permitir a compañías norteamericanas (EE.UU.) vender medicinas a Cuba, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

2. Allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

2. Allow companies to sell medicine?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	337	28.1	29.0	29.0
	MOSTLY FAVOR	310	25.8	26.6	55.6
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	138	11.5	11.9	67.4
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	379	31.6	32.6	100.0
	Total	1164	97.0	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	36	3.0		
	Total	36	3.0		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

2. Allow companies to sell medicine?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	517	43.1	44.4	44.4
	favor	647	53.9	55.6	100.0
	Total	1164	97.0	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	36	3.0		
	Total	36	3.0		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Allow companies to sell medicine

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
2. Allow companies to sell medicine?	*oppose*	59%	30%	45%	47%	25%	41%	47%	58%
	favor	41%	70%	55%	53%	75%	59%	53%	42%

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Allow companies to sell medicine

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2. Allow companies to sell medicine

2. En el pasado, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y la comunidad cubana en el exilio, han apoyado diferentes medidas hacia Cuba. Yo le voy a leer a Ud. algunas de las que se han propuesto y quisiera que Ud. me dijera si las favorece o se opone a ellas. Permitir a compañías norteamericanas (EE.UU.) vender medicinas a Cuba, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

2. Allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

2. Allow companies to sell medicine?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	337	28.1	29.0	29.0
	MOSTLY FAVOR	310	25.8	26.6	55.6
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	138	11.5	11.9	67.4
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	379	31.6	32.6	100.0
	Total	1164	97.0	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	36	3.0		
	Total	36	3.0		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

2. Allow companies to sell medicine?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	517	43.1	44.4	44.4
	favor	647	53.9	55.6	100.0
	Total	1164	97.0	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	36	3.0		
	Total	36	3.0		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Allow companies to sell medicine

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
2. Allow companies to sell medicine?	*oppose*	59%	30%	45%	47%	25%	41%	47%	58%
	favor	41%	70%	55%	53%	75%	59%	53%	42%

Tables

Allow companies to sell medicine

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
2. Allow companies to sell medicine?	*oppose*	40%	47%	51%	42%	39%	56%	51%	44%	28%
	favor	60%	53%	49%	58%	61%	44%	49%	56%	72%

Tables

Allow companies to sell medicine

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
2. Allow companies to sell medicine?	*oppose*	47%	39%	46%	33%	51%	43%	41%
	favor	53%	61%	54%	67%	49%	57%	59%

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3. Allow U.S companies to sell food

3. Permitir a compañías norteamericanas (EE.UU.) vender alimentos a Cuba, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

3. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba...Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

3. Allow U.S companies to sell food?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	244	20.3	21.1	21.1
	MOSTLY FAVOR	223	18.6	19.3	40.4
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	193	16.1	16.7	57.0
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	497	41.4	43.0	100.0
	Total	1157	96.4	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	43	3.6		
	Total	43	3.6		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

3. Allow U.S companies to sell food?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	690	57.5	59.6	59.6
	favor	467	38.9	40.4	100.0
	Total	1157	96.4	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	43	3.6		
	Total	43	3.6		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Allow U.S companies to sell food

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
3. Allow U.S companies to sell food?	*oppose*	77%	44%	60%	62%	37%	51%	63%	79%
	favor	23%	56%	40%	38%	63%	49%	37%	21%

Tables

Allow U.S companies to sell food

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
3. Allow U.S companies to sell food?	*oppose*	55%	63%	67%	57%	55%	75%	70%	55%	38%
	favor	45%	37%	33%	43%	45%	25%	30%	45%	62%

Tables

Allow U.S companies to sell food

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
3. Allow U.S companies to sell food?	*oppose*	64%	52%	62%	43%	64%	60%	55%
	favor	36%	48%	38%	57%	36%	40%	45%

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4. Support U.S. military action to overthrow

4. Apoyar una intervención militar del gobierno norteamericano (EE.UU.) para derrocar al gobierno cubano, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

4. Supporting direct U.S. military action to overthrow the Cuban government...you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

4. Support U.S. military action to overthrow?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	596	49.7	51.6	51.6
	MOSTLY FAVOR	160	13.3	13.9	65.5
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	164	13.7	14.2	79.7
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	234	19.5	20.3	100.0
	Total	1154	96.2	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	46	3.8		
	Total	46	3.8		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

4. Support U.S. military action to overthrow?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	398	33.2	34.5	34.5
	favor	756	63.0	65.5	100.0
	Total	1154	96.2	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	46	3.8		
	Total	46	3.8		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Support U.S. military action to overthrow

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
4. Support U.S. military action to overthrow?	*oppose*	26%	44%	34%	35%	40%	34%	33%	33%
	favor	74%	56%	66%	65%	60%	66%	67%	67%

Tables

Support U.S. military action to overthrow

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
4. Support U.S. military action to overthrow?	*oppose*	39%	32%	25%	38%	28%	30%	30%	29%	51%
	favor	61%	68%	75%	62%	72%	70%	70%	71%	49%

Tables

Support U.S. military action to overthrow

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
4. Support U.S. military action to overthrow?	*oppose*	33%	38%	33%	42%	32%	36%	35%
	favor	67%	62%	67%	58%	68%	64%	65%

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5. Support exile military action to overthrow

5. Apoyar acciones militares de la comunidad cubana en el exilio para derrocar al gobierno cubano, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

5. Supporting military action by the exile community to overthrow the Cuban Government...Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

5. Support exile military action to overthrow?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	646	53.8	55.5	55.5
	MOSTLY FAVOR	184	15.3	15.8	71.3
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	160	13.3	13.7	85.1
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	174	14.5	14.9	100.0
	Total	1164	97.0	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	36	3.0		
	Total	36	3.0		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

5. Support exile military action to overthrow?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	334	27.8	28.7	28.7
	favor	830	69.2	71.3	100.0
	Total	1164	97.0	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	36	3.0		
	Total	36	3.0		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Support exile military action to overthrow

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
5. Support exile military action to overthrow?	*oppose*	21%	36%	29%	27%	38%	34%	25%	21%
	favor	79%	64%	71%	73%	62%	66%	75%	79%

Tables

Support exile military action to overthrow

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
5. Support exile military action to overthrow?	*oppose*	29%	29%	23%	30%	26%	23%	23%	28%	38%
	favor	71%	71%	77%	70%	74%	77%	77%	72%	62%

Tables

Support exile military action to overthrow

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
5. Support exile military action to overthrow?	*oppose*	28%	29%	28%	37%	25%	29%	34%
	favor	72%	71%	72%	63%	75%	71%	66%

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6. Support human rights groups inside Cuba

6. Apoyar a organizaciones de derechos humanos dentro de Cuba, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

6. Supporting human rights groups inside Cuba...Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

6. Support human rights groups inside Cuba?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	859	71.6	73.9	73.9
	MOSTLY FAVOR	213	17.8	18.3	92.3
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	37	3.1	3.2	95.4
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	53	4.4	4.6	100.0
	Total	1162	96.8	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	38	3.2		
	Total	38	3.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

6. Support human rights groups inside Cuba?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	90	7.5	7.7	7.7
	favor	1072	89.3	92.3	100.0
	Total	1162	96.8	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	38	3.2		
	Total	38	3.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Support human rights groups inside Cuba

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
6. Support human rights groups inside Cuba?	*oppose*	11%	5%	8%	7%	9%	6%	7%	9%
	favor	89%	95%	92%	93%	91%	94%	93%	91%

Tables

Support human rights groups inside Cuba

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997
6. Support human rights groups inside Cuba?	*oppose*	8%	8%	10%	7%	9%	8%	11%	6%	3%
	favor	92%	92%	90%	93%	91%	92%	89%	94%	97%

Tables

Support human rights groups inside Cuba

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
6. Support human rights groups inside Cuba?	*oppose*	8%	7%	7%	11%	9%	8%	7%
	favor	92%	93%	93%	89%	91%	92%	93%

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7. Establish national dialogue

7. Establecer un diálogo nacional entre los cubanos: los exiliados, los disidentes cubanos y los representantes del gobierno, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

7. Establishing a national dialogue among Cuban exiles, Cuban dissidents, and representatives of the Cuban government...Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this?

Frequencies

7. Establish national dialogue?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY FAVOR*	333	27.8	29.7	29.7
	MOSTLY FAVOR	246	20.5	21.9	51.6
	MOSTLY OPPOSE	156	13.0	13.9	65.4
	STRONGLY OPPOSE	388	32.3	34.6	100.0
	Total	1123	93.6	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	77	6.4		
	Total	77	6.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

7. Establish national dialogue?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	544	45.3	48.4	48.4
	favor	579	48.3	51.6	100.0
	Total	1123	93.6	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	77	6.4		
	Total	77	6.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Establish national dialogue

		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age				Gender of respondent	
		not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older	MALE	FEMALE
7. Establish national dialogue?	*oppose*	48%	52%	23%	40%	56%	64%	47%	49%
	favor	52%	48%	77%	60%	44%	36%	53%	51%

Tables

Establish national dialogue

		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?					50. Are you a U.S. citizen?	
		less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997	citizen	not citizen
7. Establish national dialogue?	*oppose*	58%	45%	55%	62%	59%	49%	26%	51%	43%
	favor	42%	55%	45%	38%	41%	51%	74%	49%	57%

Tables

Establish national dialogue

		race		income		
		White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
7. Establish national dialogue?	*oppose*	50%	39%	52%	51%	41%
	favor	50%	61%	48%	49%	59%

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8. Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business with Cuba

8. Prohibirle a compañías de los EE.UU. hacer negocios con Cuba, Ud. favorece fuertemente, favorece, se opone o se opone fuertemente a esto?

8. Prohibiting U.S companies from doing business with Cuba, [do you strongly approve, mostly approve, mostly disapprove, or strongly disapprove?]

Frequencies

8. Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*STRONGLY APPROVE*	592	49.3	50.5	50.5
	MOSTLY APPROVE	124	10.3	10.6	61.1
	MOSTLY DISAPPROVE	161	13.4	13.7	74.8
	STRONGLY DISAPPROVE	295	24.6	25.2	100.0
	Total	1172	97.7	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	28	2.3		
	Total	28	2.3		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

8. Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*oppose*	456	38.0	38.9	38.9
	favor	716	59.7	61.1	100.0
	Total	1172	97.7	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	28	2.3		
	Total	28	2.3		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
8. Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business?	*oppose*	37%	41%	40%	38%	43%	40%	39%	35%
	favor	63%	59%	60%	62%	57%	60%	61%	65%

Tables

Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
8. Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business?	*oppose*	39%	39%	34%	40%	44%	39%	36%	35%	42%
	favor	61%	61%	66%	60%	56%	61%	64%	65%	58%

Tables

Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
8. Prohibit U.S. companies from doing business?	*oppose*	39%	39%	36%	59%	41%	38%	39%
	favor	61%	61%	64%	41%	59%	62%	61%

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9. Overall how well has embargo worked?

9. En general, piensa Ud. que el embargo a Cuba ha funcionado muy bien, bien, no muy bien, o que no ha funcionado nada?

9. Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all?

Frequencies

9. Overall how well has embargo worked?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	VERY WELL	85	7.1	7.3	7.3
	WELL	201	16.8	17.3	24.7
	NOT VERY WELL	491	40.9	42.3	67.0
	NOT AT ALL	383	31.9	33.0	100.0
	Total	1160	96.7	100.0	
Missing	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	40	3.3		
	Total	40	3.3		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997
13. Allow to sue for seized property	*oppose*	21%	21%	17%	22%	21%	17%	24%	17%	19%
	favor	79%	79%	83%	78%	79%	83%	76%	83%	81%

Tables

Allow to sue for seized property

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
13. Allow to sue for seized property	*oppose*	22%	19%	19%	28%	17%	20%	25%
	favor	78%	81%	81%	72%	83%	80%	75%

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14. How much have you heard about Helms-Burton?

14. Ahora, tengo un par de preguntas sobre la llamada ley Helms-Burton. Primero, quiero preguntarle cuánto ha oído hablar sobre la ley "Helms-Burton" y cómo se supone que funcione. Ha oído hablar mucho sobre la ley, poco sobre esta ley o no ha oído mucho sobre esta ley?

14. Now, I have a couple of questions having to do with the Helms-Burton law, which was passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton in 1996. First, I'd like to ask how much you have heard about the Helms-Burton law and how it is supposed to work. Have you heard a lot, heard a little, or not heard much at all about the Helms-Burton law?

Frequencies

14. How much have you heard about Helms-Burton?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	HEARD A LOT	659	54.9	56.4	56.4
	HEARD A LITTLE	332	27.7	28.4	84.8
	NOT HEARD MUCH AT ALL	178	14.8	15.2	100.0
	Total	1169	97.4	100.0	
Missing	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	31	2.6		
	Total	31	2.6		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

How much have you heard about Helms-Burton

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
14. How much have you heard about Helms-Burton?	*HEARD A LOT*	62%	52%	56%	58%	32%	48%	66%	67%
	HEARD A LITTLE	27%	30%	28%	29%	33%	36%	25%	23%
	NOT HEARD MUCH AT ALL	11%	18%	16%	13%	35%	16%	9%	10%

Tables

How much have you heard about Helms-Burton

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	19
14. How much have you heard about Helms-Burton?	*HEARD A LOT*	58%	55%	59%	55%	65%	61%	61%	58%	
	HEARD A LITTLE	29%	28%	28%	28%	29%	27%	27%	26%	
	NOT HEARD MUCH AT ALL	14%	16%	13%	16%	6%	12%	12%	16%	

Tables

How much have you heard about Helms-Burton

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
14. How much have you heard about Helms-Burton?	*HEARD A LOT*	55%	58%	57%	54%	59%	55%	49%
	HEARD A LITTLE	28%	30%	28%	34%	28%	31%	30%
	NOT HEARD MUCH AT ALL	17%	12%	15%	11%	13%	14%	20%

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15. Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring change in Cuba?

15. Cree Ud. que la ley "Helms-Burton" es una buena o una mala idea para crear cambios en Cuba?

15. Do you think the Helms-Burton law is a good idea or a bad idea as a way of bringing about change in Cuba?

Frequencies

15. Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*GOOD IDEA*	736	61.3	75.2	75.2
	BAD IDEA	131	10.9	13.4	88.6
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	112	9.3	11.4	100.0
	Total	979	81.6	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	221	18.4		
	Total	221	18.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
15. Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang	*GOOD IDEA*	85%	65%	71%	89%	64%	67%	78%	84%
	BAD IDEA	8%	19%	16%	4%	21%	19%	13%	6%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	7%	15%	13%	7%	15%	14%	10%	10%

Tables

Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cub			
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-198
15. Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang	*GOOD IDEA*	74%	76%	79%	74%	81%	81%	79%	78%
	BAD IDEA	16%	12%	8%	16%	12%	10%	10%	10%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	10%	13%	13%	10%	7%	9%	11%	12%

Tables

Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
15. Helms-Burton good or bad as way to bring chang	*GOOD IDEA*	77%	73%	77%	65%	78%	76%	72%
	BAD IDEA	13%	15%	13%	17%	12%	11%	18%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	10%	13%	11%	18%	9%	13%	9%

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16. President or the U.S. Congress decide when embargo ends

16. Quién cree Ud. debe tener la autoridad de decidir cuándo terminará el embargo: -- el presidente o el congreso de los E.U.?

16. Who do you think should have the main authority to decide when the economic embargo ends -- The President or the U.S. Congress?

Frequencies

16. President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*THE PRESIDENT*	259	21.6	23.9	23.9
	U.S. CONGRESS	788	65.7	72.8	96.8
	NEITHER	35	2.9	3.2	100.0
	Total	1082	90.2	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	118	9.8		
	Total	118	9.8		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30–44	45-64	65 and older
16. President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb	*THE PRESIDENT*	23%	24%	22%	28%	22%	27%	23%	23%
	U.S. CONGRESS	74%	72%	74%	71%	75%	70%	73%	74%
	NEITHER	3%	3%	3%	1%	3%	3%	4%	3%

Tables

President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	199
16. President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb	*THE PRESIDENT*	21%	26%	29%	23%	19%	24%	23%	22%	
	U.S. CONGRESS	76%	71%	66%	75%	78%	72%	76%	75%	
	NEITHER	3%	3%	5%	3%	3%	4%	1%	3%	

Tables

President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
16. President or the U.S. Congress decide when emb	*THE PRESIDENT*	21%	31%	24%	27%	25%	24%	20%
	U.S. CONGRESS	75%	67%	73%	69%	72%	72%	77%
	NEITHER	4%	2%	3%	3%	3%	4%	3%

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17. Which more important: free elections or free market economy?

17. Cuando el gobierno cubano cambie y Fidel Castro y su hermano, Raúl, ya no estén en el poder, en su opinión cuál de estos dos procesos es el más importante y qué debe ocurrir primero en la isla: celebrar elecciones libres o establecer una economía de libre comercio?

17. When the government changes in Cuba and Fidel and Raul Castro are no longer in power, which do you think is the more important thing which has to happen first: holding free elections or establishing a free market economy?

Frequencies

17. Which more important: free elections or free m

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*FREE ELECTIONS*	574	47.8	48.7	48.7
	FREE MARKET ECONOMY	330	27.5	28.0	76.7
	BOTH – FREE ELECTIONS/FREE MARKET ECONOMY	255	21.3	21.6	98.4
	NEITHER	19	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	1178	98.2	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	22	1.8		
	Total	22	1.8		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Which more important: free elections or free m

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
17. Which more important: free elections or free m	*FREE ELECTIONS*	50%	49%	48%	50%	44%	49%	52%	48%
	FREE MARKET ECONOMY	28%	29%	30%	23%	40%	31%	26%	21%
	BOTH – FREE ELECTIONS/FREE MARKET ECONOMY	21%	21%	20%	25%	15%	20%	20%	30%
	NEITHER	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%	2%

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Which more important: free elections or free m

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cu			
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-19
17. Which more important: free elections or free m	*FREE ELECTIONS*	44%	52%	51%	48%	53%	48%	54%	47%
	FREE MARKET ECONOMY	33%	25%	23%	30%	27%	28%	26%	24%
	BOTH – FREE ELECTIONS/FREE MARKET ECONOMY	20%	23%	24%	20%	20%	22%	19%	26%
	NEITHER	3%	1%	2%	1%		1%	1%	3%

Tables

Which more important: free elections or free m

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
17. Which more important: free elections or free m	*FREE ELECTIONS*	47%	52%	48%	54%	55%	48%	43%
	FREE MARKET ECONOMY	31%	22%	28%	30%	23%	29%	40%
	BOTH -- FREE ELECTIONS/FREE MARKET ECONOMY	21%	23%	22%	16%	20%	21%	15%
	NEITHER	2%	2%	2%		2%	2%	1%

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18. After Fidel how involved should U.S. be in Cuba?

18. Inmediatamente después de que Fidel y Raúl Castro abandonen el poder, cree Ud. que E.U. debería estar muy involucrado, poco involucrado o no debería jugar ningún papel en lo que ocurra en Cuba?

18. Immediately after Fidel and Raul Castro leave power, do you think the United States should be very involved in what happens in Cuba, somewhat involved, or not involved at all?

Frequencies

18. After Fidel how involved should U.S. be?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*VERY INVOLVED*	596	49.7	50.9	50.9
	SOMEWHAT INVOLVED	408	34.0	34.8	85.7
	NOT INVOLVED AT ALL	167	13.9	14.3	100.0
	Total	1171	97.6	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	29	2.4		
	Total	29	2.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

After Fidel how involved should U.S. be

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
18. After Fidel how involved should U.S. be?	*VERY INVOLVED*	56%	46%	49%	54%	40%	49%	55%	55%
	SOMEWHAT INVOLVED	31%	38%	35%	34%	47%	34%	31%	32%
	NOT INVOLVED AT ALL	13%	16%	15%	12%	13%	17%	15%	13%

Tables

After Fidel how involved should U.S. be

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-
18. After Fidel how involved should U.S. be?	*VERY INVOLVED*	52%	50%	55%	49%	55%	54%	58%	48%	
	SOMEWHAT INVOLVED	33%	36%	27%	38%	35%	34%	26%	34%	
	NOT INVOLVED AT ALL	15%	14%	18%	13%	9%	12%	16%	18%	

Tables

After Fidel how involved should U.S. be

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
18. After Fidel how involved should U.S. be?	*VERY INVOLVED*	53%	47%	52%	40%	53%	51%	53%
	SOMEWHAT INVOLVED	35%	35%	34%	39%	30%	33%	40%
	NOT INVOLVED AT ALL	12%	19%	14%	21%	17%	16%	8%

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19. After Fidel should next president of Cuba be exile or person living in Cuba?

19. Inmediatamente después de que Fidel y Raúl Castro abandonen el poder, cree Ud. que será mejor que el próximo presidente de Cuba sea alguien que ahora reside en Cuba o alguien del exilio?

19. Immediately after Fidel and Raul Castro leave power, which do you think would be better: that the next president of Cuba be someone now living in Cuba, or be someone from the exile community?

Frequencies

19. After Fidel should next president of Cuba be e

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SOMEONE IN CUBA	454	37.8	41.8	41.8
	FROM EXILE COMMUNITY	299	24.9	27.6	69.4
	EITHER	292	24.3	26.9	96.3
	NEITHER	40	3.3	3.7	100.0
	Total	1085	90.4	100.0	
Missing	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	115	9.6		
	Total	115	9.6		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

After Fidel should next president of Cuba be exile

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
19. After Fidel should next president of Cuba be e	*SOMEONE IN CUBA*	37%	46%	43%	41%	39%	46%	42%	39%
	FROM EXILE COMMUNITY	28%	28%	26%	30%	48%	27%	21%	23%
	EITHER	32%	23%	28%	24%	10%	23%	32%	36%
	NEITHER	4%	3%	3%	5%	2%	4%	5%	3%

Tables

After Fidel should next president of Cuba be exile

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	19
19. After Fidel should next president of Cuba be e	*SOMEONE IN CUBA*	46%	39%	35%	44%	45%	39%	41%	45%	
	FROM EXILE COMMUNITY	24%	30%	28%	27%	23%	24%	26%	24%	
	EITHER	25%	28%	34%	24%	32%	31%	28%	29%	
	NEITHER	4%	3%	2%	4%		5%	5%	1%	

Tables

After Fidel should next president of Cuba be exile

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
19. After Fidel should next president of Cuba be e	*SOMEONE IN CUBA*	41%	44%	41%	56%	39%	42%	47%
	FROM EXILE COMMUNITY	28%	26%	27%	29%	26%	28%	25%
	EITHER	26%	28%	28%	13%	32%	27%	23%
	NEITHER	4%	2%	4%	1%	3%	3%	5%

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20. What effect visit of Pope to Cuba

20. El Papa esta organizando una visita a Cuba para el año entrante. Algunos piensan que este hecho fomentará cambios en Cuba. Otros piensan que la visita legitimará al gobierno cubano aún más. Qué piensa Ud. -- será un factor de cambio o de legitimación?

20. The Pope is planning to visit Cuba next year. Some think this will encourage change in Cuba. Others think it will give the Cuban government more legitimacy. Others believe the visit will not make any difference. What do you think it will produce -- change, more legitimacy for the government, or will it make no difference?

Frequencies

20. What effect Pope's visit to Cuba?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	MORE CHANGE	383	31.9	33.6	33.6
	MORE LEGITIMACY	166	13.8	14.6	48.2
	NO DIFFERENCE	590	49.2	51.8	100.0
	Total	1139	94.9	100.0	
Missing	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	61	5.1		
	Total	61	5.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

What effect visit of Pope to Cuba

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
20. What effect Pope's visit to Cuba?	*MORE CHANGE*	33%	34%	33%	38%	29%	29%	41%	32%
	MORE LEGITIMACY	14%	14%	15%	14%	13%	16%	15%	13%
	NO DIFFERENCE	53%	52%	52%	48%	58%	55%	44%	55%

Tables

What effect visit of Pope to Cuba

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990
20. What effect Pope's visit to Cuba?	*MORE CHANGE*	36%	32%	34%	34%	34%	36%	34%	38%	
	MORE LEGITIMACY	17%	13%	11%	16%	11%	15%	11%	13%	
	NO DIFFERENCE	46%	55%	55%	51%	55%	49%	54%	49%	

Tables

What effect visit of Pope to Cuba

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
20. What effect Pope's visit to Cuba?	*MORE CHANGE*	32%	38%	34%	31%	31%	39%	32%
	MORE LEGITIMACY	15%	14%	14%	15%	17%	14%	15%
	NO DIFFERENCE	54%	48%	51%	54%	52%	48%	52%

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21. What effect on US economy of embargo end and more trade

21. Si Estados Unidos termina el embargo económico y comienza relaciones comerciales con Cuba, Qué efecto cree Ud. tendrá este acontecimiento en la economía del sur de la Florida? Tendrá un efecto grande, mediano, pequeño o no habrá ningún efecto?

21. If the U.S. ends the economic embargo and resumes normal economic trade with Cuba, what effect do you think this would have on the South Florida economy: a major effect, a medium effect, a minor effect, or no effect at all?

Frequencies

21. What effect on US economy of embargo end and t

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	MAJOR	621	51.8	56.0	56.0
	MEDIUM	220	18.3	19.9	75.9
	MINOR	100	8.3	9.0	84.9
	NO EFFECT AT ALL	167	13.9	15.1	100.0
	Total	1108	92.3	100.0	
Missing	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	92	7.7		
	Total	92	7.7		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

What effect on US economy of embargo end and more trade

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
21. What effect on US economy of embargo end and t	*MAJOR*	56%	57%	55%	59%	50%	59%	63%	48%
	MEDIUM	18%	21%	21%	15%	26%	18%	17%	22%
	MINOR	8%	9%	8%	10%	13%	12%	6%	7%
	NO EFFECT AT ALL	19%	13%	15%	16%	11%	11%	14%	24%

Tables

What effect on US economy of embargo end and more trade

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-19
21. What effect on US economy of embargo end and t	*MAJOR*	58%	55%	51%	58%	53%	52%	59%	63%	56
	MEDIUM	17%	22%	23%	19%	23%	20%	17%	17%	20
	MINOR	11%	8%	6%	10%	8%	10%	8%	6%	9
	NO EFFECT AT ALL	14%	16%	21%	13%	16%	18%	15%	14%	15

Tables

What effect on US economy of embargo end and more trade

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
21. What effect on US economy of embargo end and t	*MAJOR*	56%	57%	55%	66%	55%	54%	60%
	MEDIUM	20%	20%	20%	18%	20%	20%	19%
	MINOR	9%	8%	9%	10%	7%	10%	11%
	NO EFFECT AT ALL	15%	15%	16%	5%	19%	16%	9%

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22. Allow travel to visit relatives

22. Hoy en día, los cubanos que viven en los EE.UU. pueden visitar parientes en la isla usando una visa humanitaria. En su opinión, se debe continuar esta clase de visita o se debe descontinuar?

22. At present, Cubans who need to visit their relatives in the island are allowed to enter with humanitarian visas. Should this kind of travel to Cuba be allowed or discontinued?

Frequencies

22. Allow travel to visit relatives?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*ALLOWED*	832	69.3	70.3	70.3
	DISCONTINUED	351	29.3	29.7	100.0
	Total	1183	98.6	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	17	1.4		
	Total	17	1.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Allow travel to visit relatives

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
22. Allow travel to visit relatives?	*ALLOWED*	60%	80%	69%	72%	87%	78%	68%	56%
	DISCONTINUED	40%	20%	31%	28%	13%	22%	32%	44%

Tables

Allow travel to visit relatives

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?			
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989
22. Allow travel to visit relatives?	*ALLOWED*	73%	69%	67%	71%	64%	56%	70%	74%
	DISCONTINUED	27%	31%	33%	29%	36%	44%	30%	26%

Tables

Allow travel to visit relatives

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
22. Allow travel to visit relatives?	*ALLOWED*	65%	81%	69%	77%	69%	70%	71%
	DISCONTINUED	35%	19%	31%	23%	31%	30%	29%

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23. Allow travel just to visit

23. Se deben permitir viajes a Cuba solamente para visitar la isla, en vez de específicamente para visitar a familiares, si o no?

23. Should travel to Cuba, just to visit Cuba, rather than specifically to visit relatives, be allowed or not?

Frequencies

23. Allow travel just to visit?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*YES, ALLOWED*	269	22.4	22.6	22.6
	NO, NOT ALLOWED	922	76.8	77.4	100.0
	Total	1191	99.3	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	9	.8		
	Total	9	.8		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

All travel just to visit

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
23. Allow travel just to visit?	*YES, ALLOWED*	12%	32%	24%	20%	40%	29%	17%	11%
	NO, NOT ALLOWED	88%	68%	76%	80%	60%	71%	83%	89%

Tables

All travel just to visit

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
23. Allow travel just to visit?	*YES, ALLOWED*	25%	21%	16%	25%	17%	13%	22%	22%	31%
	NO, NOT ALLOWED	75%	79%	84%	75%	83%	87%	78%	78%	69%

Tables

All travel just to visit

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
23. Allow travel just to visit?	*YES, ALLOWED*	21%	25%	19%	52%	21%	22%	27%
	NO, NOT ALLOWED	79%	75%	81%	48%	79%	78%	73%

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24. Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English

24. Prefiere Ud. recibir las noticias en español o en inglés?

24. Do you prefer to get your news in Spanish or in English?

Frequencies

24. Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*SPANISH*	638	53.2	53.4	53.4
	ENGLISH	264	22.0	22.1	75.5
	BOTH	292	24.3	24.5	100.0
	Total	1194	99.5	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	6	.5		
	Total	6	.5		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
24. Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English?	*SPANISH*	59%	47%	55%	50%	21%	37%	60%	81%
	ENGLISH	15%	29%	22%	23%	52%	39%	10%	3%
	BOTH	26%	24%	24%	27%	27%	24%	30%	17%

Tables

Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-19
24. Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English?	*SPANISH*	46%	58%	85%	42%	41%	51%	62%	77%	73
	ENGLISH	28%	18%	5%	29%	24%	19%	15%	8%	6
	BOTH	26%	24%	10%	30%	35%	30%	24%	15%	21

Tables

Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
24. Prefer to get news in Spanish or in English?	*SPANISH*	43%	75%	53%	66%	80%	46%	15%
	ENGLISH	29%	7%	22%	18%	6%	25%	47%
	BOTH	28%	18%	25%	16%	13%	29%	38%

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25. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba

25. De dónde obtiene Ud. la mayoría de las noticias sobre Cuba? Periódicos, televisión, radio, o alguna otra fuente?

25. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba -- newspapers, television, radio or some other source?

Frequencies

25. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*NEWSPAPERS*	236	19.7	19.9	19.9
	TELEVISION	615	51.3	51.8	71.7
	RADIO	254	21.2	21.4	93.1
	WORD-OF-MOUTH FROM FAMILY OR OTHERS	53	4.4	4.5	97.6
	OTHER _____	29	2.4	2.4	100.0
	Total	1187	98.9	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	13	1.1		
	Total	13	1.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Where do you get most of your news about Cuba

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
25. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba?	*NEWSPAPERS*	17%	23%	20%	21%	14%	21%	22%	20%
	TELEVISION	49%	53%	51%	54%	64%	58%	49%	42%
	RADIO	29%	15%	23%	19%	7%	13%	24%	35%
	WORD-OF-MOUTH FROM FAMILY OR OTHERS	4%	5%	4%	3%	11%	4%	4%	2%
	OTHER _____	2%	3%	2%	4%	4%	3%	1%	1%

Tables

Where do you get most of your news about Cuba

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you lea			
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	19
25. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba?	*NEWSPAPERS*	22%	18%	10%	24%	20%	25%	17%	
	TELEVISION	49%	54%	56%	50%	50%	43%	52%	
	RADIO	22%	21%	33%	18%	24%	25%	24%	
	WORD-OF-MOUTH FROM FAMILY OR OTHERS	3%	5%	2%	5%	6%	3%	4%	
	OTHER _____	4%	1%		3%		3%	2%	

Tables

Where do you get most of your news about Cuba

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
25. Where do you get most of your news about Cuba?	*NEWSPAPERS*	24%	12%	21%	8%	14%	21%	33%
	TELEVISION	47%	60%	51%	63%	54%	54%	41%
	RADIO	21%	23%	21%	28%	29%	19%	16%
	WORD-OF-MOUTH FROM FAMILY OR OTHERS	5%	3%	4%	1%	2%	5%	6%
	OTHER _____	3%	2%	2%		2%	2%	4%

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26. Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba

26. Los gobiernos de E.U. y Cuba le han dado a Cable News Network (CNN) permiso para establecer la única oficina de noticias de los EE.UU. en Cuba. Cree Ud. que está bien o mal permitirle a CNN tener una oficina de noticias en Cuba?

26. The U.S. and Cuban governments have given CNN [Cable News Network] permission to establish the only American news bureau in Cuba to date. Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to allow CNN to have a news bureau in Cuba?

Frequencies

26. Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*GOOD IDEA*	626	52.2	55.1	55.1
	BAD IDEA	451	37.6	39.7	94.7
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	60	5.0	5.3	100.0
	Total	1137	94.8	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	63	5.3		
	Total	63	5.3		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
26. Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba?	*GOOD IDEA*	40%	70%	55%	55%	84%	65%	51%	33%
	BAD IDEA	55%	25%	41%	38%	14%	30%	45%	59%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	6%	5%	5%	7%	2%	5%	5%	8%

Tables

Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	199(
26. Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba?	*GOOD IDEA*	60%	52%	41%	60%	51%	43%	51%	51%	
	BAD IDEA	37%	42%	52%	35%	43%	52%	42%	43%	
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	4%	6%	7%	5%	6%	5%	6%	6%	

Tables

Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
26. Good or bad for CNN to have bureau in Cuba?	*GOOD IDEA*	53%	60%	53%	63%	51%	54%	64%
	BAD IDEA	42%	34%	41%	33%	44%	40%	34%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	5%	6%	5%	4%	4%	6%	2%

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27. Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in Cuba

27. Y The Miami Herald? Piensa usted que sería una buena idea o una mala idea que The Miami Herald tuviera una oficina de noticias en Cuba?

27. What about the Miami Herald? Would it be a good idea or a bad idea if the Miami Herald were allowed to have a news bureau in Cuba?

Frequencies

27. Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*GOOD IDEA*	632	52.7	55.7	55.7
	BAD IDEA	445	37.1	39.2	95.0
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	57	4.8	5.0	100.0
	Total	1134	94.5	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	66	5.5		
	Total	66	5.5		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in Cuba

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
27. Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in	*GOOD IDEA*	40%	71%	55%	56%	77%	64%	52%	39%
	BAD IDEA	55%	24%	40%	39%	21%	30%	43%	54%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	5%	5%	5%	5%	2%	5%	5%	6%

Tables

Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in Cuba

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	199(
27. Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in	*GOOD IDEA*	65%	50%	46%	60%	51%	43%	47%	57%	
	BAD IDEA	31%	45%	48%	36%	44%	52%	46%	37%	
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	5%	5%	6%	5%	5%	6%	7%	6%	

Tables

Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in Cuba

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
27. Good or bad for Miami Herald to have bureau in	*GOOD IDEA*	52%	65%	55%	57%	54%	55%	61%
	BAD IDEA	43%	30%	40%	40%	42%	40%	35%
	DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE	5%	5%	5%	3%	4%	5%	4%

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28. How important position on Cuba for your vote in elections

28. En las elecciones políticas locales, cuán importante es la posición de cada candidato sobre Cuba en determinar su voto? Diría Ud. que es muy importante, moderadamente importante, no es muy importante o no tiene ninguna importancia?

28. In local political elections, how important is a candidate's position on Cuba in determining your vote - would you say it is very important, moderately important, not very important, or not at all important?

Frequencies

28. How important politician's position for Cuba o

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*VERY IMPORTANT*	466	38.8	42.0	42.0
	MODERATELY IMPORTANT	315	26.3	28.4	70.4
	NOT VERY IMPORTANT	152	12.7	13.7	84.1
	NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT	177	14.8	15.9	100.0
	Total	1110	92.5	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	90	7.5		
	Total	90	7.5		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

28. How important politician's position for Cuba o

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*not important*	329	27.4	29.6	29.6
	important	781	65.1	70.4	100.0
	Total	1110	92.5	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	90	7.5		
	Total	90	7.5		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

How important position Cuba for your vote

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
28. How important politician's position for Cuba o	*not important*	29%	30%	31%	26%	28%	36%	30%	25%
	important	71%	70%	69%	74%	72%	64%	70%	75%

Tables

How important position Cuba for your vote

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-
28. How important politician's position for Cuba o	*not important*	35%	26%	28%	30%	29%	29%	30%	26%	2
	important	65%	74%	72%	70%	71%	71%	70%	74%	7

Tables

How important position Cuba for your vote

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
28. How important politician's position for Cuba o	*not important*	31%	26%	30%	27%	28%	29%	34%
	important	69%	74%	70%	73%	72%	71%	66%

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29. All points of view are being heard in Miami now?

29. En Miami, hoy en día, cree Ud. que todos los puntos de vista sobre cómo lidiar con el régimen de Castro están siendo escuchados o siente que algunos puntos de vista no están siendo escuchados?

29. In Miami right now, do you feel that all points of view on how to deal with the Castro regime are being heard or do you feel that some views are not being heard?

Frequencies

29. All point of view are being heard in Miami now

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*ALL VIEWS ARE BEING HEARD*	263	21.9	23.2	23.2
	SOME VIEWS ARE NOT BEING HEARD	801	66.8	70.8	94.0
	DEPENDS	68	5.7	6.0	100.0
	Total	1132	94.3	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.*	68	5.7		
	Total	68	5.7		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

All points of view are being heard in Miami now

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
29. All point of view are being heard in Miami now	*ALL VIEWS ARE BEING HEARD*	25%	22%	21%	30%	15%	24%	26%	24%
	SOME VIEWS ARE NOT BEING HEARD	68%	73%	74%	62%	83%	70%	68%	67%
	DEPENDS	7%	5%	5%	8%	2%	6%	6%	8%

Tables

All points of view are being heard in Miami now

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
29. All point of view are being heard in Miami now	*ALL VIEWS ARE BEING HEARD*	23%	23%	28%	21%	21%	25%	21%	27%	23%
	SOME VIEWS ARE NOT BEING HEARD	70%	71%	66%	72%	74%	67%	71%	68%	72%
	DEPENDS	6%	6%	6%	6%	5%	7%	8%	5%	6%

Tables

All points of view are being heard in Miami now

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
29. All point of view are being heard in Miami now	*ALL VIEWS ARE BEING HEARD*	22%	26%	23%	24%	27%	20%	25%
	SOME VIEWS ARE NOT BEING HEARD	72%	69%	70%	73%	69%	75%	69%
	DEPENDS	6%	6%	7%	3%	4%	5%	6%

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30. How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio

30. Recientemente, una estación de radio de Miami comenzó a transmitir música cubana contemporánea creada por artistas que viven en Cuba, pero dejó de transmitir esta música después de protestas y presiones. Está Ud. de acuerdo o no con la decisión de la estación de terminar sus transmisiones de esta música?

30. Recently, a Miami radio station began broadcasting contemporary Cuban music by Cuban artists living in Cuba, but was pressured to cease broadcasting the music because of some protests. Did you agree or disagree with the decision of the radio station to stop broadcasting the music?

Frequencies

30. How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*AGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP*	514	42.8	46.8	46.8
	DISAGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP	585	48.8	53.2	100.0
	Total	1099	91.6	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	101	8.4		
	Total	101	8.4		
Total		1200	100.0		

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How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio

		32. Opinion agrees with how much of community		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?	
		some/few	most	oppose	favor	not well	well
30. How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio	*AGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP*	30%	61%	63%	31%	46%	53%
	DISAGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP	70%	39%	37%	69%	54%	47%

Tables

How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio

		Age				Gender of respondent		high school graduate	
		18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older	MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more
30. How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio	*AGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP*	30%	36%	54%	60%	45%	48%	53%	45%
	DISAGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP	70%	64%	46%	40%	55%	52%	47%	55%

Tables

How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio

		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?					50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race	
		1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997	citizen	not citizen	White	Black Mulatt
30. How feel about ban on music from Cuba on radio	*AGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP*	56%	55%	52%	47%	35%	50%	41%	49%	30%
	DISAGREE WITH DECISION TO STOP	44%	45%	48%	53%	65%	50%	59%	51%	70%

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31. How feel about decision re Montanes

31. Recientemente a Andy Montañés, un músico Puertorriqueño, se le prohibió presentarse en el Festival de la Calle Ocho por haberle dado la bienvenida a Puerto Rico a un músico cubano amigo del gobierno de Castro. Está Ud. de acuerdo o no con la decisión de prohibirle a Montañés que se presentara en el Festival de la Calle Ocho?

31. Recently Andy Montañes, a Puerto Rican musician, was not allowed to perform at the Calle Ocho Festival because he had publicly welcomed in Puerto Rico a musician friendly to the Castro government. Did you agree or disagree with the decision to exclude Montañes from the Calle Ocho Festival?

Frequencies

31. How feel about decision re Montanes?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*AGREE*	458	38.2	41.1	41.1
	DISAGREE	657	54.8	58.9	100.0
	Total	1115	92.9	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	85	7.1		
	Total	85	7.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

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How feel about decision re Montanes

		32. Opinion agrees with how much of community		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?	
		some/few	most	oppose	favor	not well	well
31. How feel about decision re Montanes?	*AGREE*	17%	63%	56%	27%	41%	44%
	DISAGREE	83%	37%	44%	73%	59%	56%

Tables

How feel about decision re Montanes

		Age				Gender of respondent		high school graduate	
		18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older	MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more
31. How feel about decision re Montanes?	*AGREE*	29%	30%	48%	51%	41%	41%	46%	39%
	DISAGREE	71%	70%	52%	49%	59%	59%	54%	61%

Tables

How feel about decision re Montanes

		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?					50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race	
		1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997	citizen	not citizen	White	B M
31. How feel about decision re Montanes?	*AGREE*	41%	50%	47%	41%	27%	43%	36%	43%	
	DISAGREE	59%	50%	53%	59%	73%	57%	64%	57%	

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33. Would return to Cuba if better economy?

33. Tengo unas preguntas sobre cómo los cambios puedan afectar a gente de aquí que quisiera volver y viceversa. Suponga que Cuba tuviera una recuperación económica tan grande que las condiciones de vida y las posibilidades económicas mejoraran considerablemente, volvería a Cuba a vivir?-- Ud. diría que es muy probable, algo probable, no muy probable o improbable?

33. I have a few questions about how changes in Cuba might affect people here wanting to go back there and vice-versa. Suppose Cuba suddenly had a major economic recovery so that living conditions and economic opportunity became much better: how likely is it that you would return to Cuba to live - would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

Frequencies

33. Would go return to Cuba if better economy?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	VERY LIKELY	129	10.8	11.0	11.0
	SOMEWHAT LIKELY	136	11.3	11.6	22.6
	NOT VERY LIKELY	163	13.6	13.9	36.5
	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	746	62.2	63.5	100.0
	Total	1174	97.8	100.0	
Missing	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.	26	2.2		
	Total	26	2.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

33. Would go return to Cuba if better economy?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*unlikely*	909	75.8	77.4	77.4
	likely	265	22.1	22.6	100.0
	Total	1174	97.8	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	26	2.2		
	Total	26	2.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if better economy

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
33. Would go return to Cuba if better economy?	*unlikely*	80%	75%	77%	78%	78%	77%	73%	84%
	likely	20%	25%	23%	23%	22%	23%	27%	16%

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if better economy

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-199
33. Would go return to Cuba if better economy?	*unlikely*	74%	80%	76%	78%	86%	83%	75%	73%	66%
	likely	26%	20%	24%	22%	14%	17%	25%	27%	34%

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if better economy

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
33. Would go return to Cuba if better economy?	*unlikely*	81%	70%	77%	79%	79%	75%	82%
	likely	19%	30%	23%	21%	21%	25%	18%

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34. Would return to Cuba if democratic government?

34. Y, si Cuba cambiara a un gobierno democrático, pero continuara con problemas económicos, volvería a Cuba a vivir? Ud. diría que es muy probable, algo probable, no muy probable o improbable?

34. What if Cuba changed to a democratic form of government but continued to have major economic problems: how likely is it that you would return to Cuba to live - would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

Frequencies

34. Would go return to Cuba if democratic governme

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*VERY LIKELY*	168	14.0	14.3	14.3
	SOMEWHAT LIKELY	176	14.7	15.0	29.2
	NOT VERY LIKELY	220	18.3	18.7	47.9
	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	613	51.1	52.1	100.0
	Total	1177	98.1	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.*	23	1.9		
	Total	23	1.9		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

34. Would go return to Cuba if democratic governme

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*unlikely*	833	69.4	70.8	70.8
	likely	344	28.7	29.2	100.0
	Total	1177	98.1	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	23	1.9		
	Total	23	1.9		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if democratic government

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
34. Would go return to Cuba if democratic governme	*unlikely*	67%	74%	69%	73%	77%	78%	64%	69%
	likely	33%	26%	31%	27%	23%	22%	36%	31%

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if democratic government

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-19
34. Would go return to Cuba if democratic governme	*unlikely*	65%	75%	65%	73%	76%	74%	74%	61%	58%
	likely	35%	25%	35%	27%	24%	26%	26%	39%	42%

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if democratic government

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
34. Would go return to Cuba if democratic governme	*unlikely*	76%	59%	71%	72%	69%	70%	80%
	likely	24%	41%	29%	28%	31%	30%	20%

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34A. Would go return to Cuba if both?

34a. Ahora suponga que ambas situaciones ocurrieran -- que Cuba tuviera una recuperación económica y cambiara a un gobierno democratico, volvería a Cuba a vivir? Ud. diría que es muy probable, algo probable, no muy probable o improbable?

34a. What if both happened.-- Cuba changed to a democratic form of government and had a major economic recovery: how likely is it that you would return to Cuba to live - would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

Frequencies

34a. Would go return to Cuba if both?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*VERY LIKELY*	332	27.7	28.3	28.3
	SOMEWHAT LIKELY	195	16.3	16.6	44.9
	NOT VERY LIKELY	165	13.8	14.1	58.9
	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	482	40.2	41.1	100.0
	Total	1174	97.8	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.*	26	2.2		
	Total	26	2.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

34a. Would go return to Cuba if both?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*unlikely*	647	53.9	55.1	55.1
	likely	527	43.9	44.9	100.0
	Total	1174	97.8	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	26	2.2		
	Total	26	2.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if both

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
34a. Would go return to Cuba if both?	*unlikely*	55%	54%	54%	56%	62%	57%	46%	59%
	likely	45%	46%	46%	44%	38%	43%	54%	41%

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if both

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997
34a. Would go return to Cuba if both?	*unlikely*	47%	61%	50%	57%	71%	60%	55%	46%	37%
	likely	53%	39%	50%	43%	29%	40%	45%	54%	63%

Tables

Would go return to Cuba if both

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
34a. Would go return to Cuba if both?	*unlikely*	61%	42%	55%	56%	53%	53%	65%
	likely	39%	58%	45%	44%	47%	47%	35%

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35. If new government in Cuba would more people come to US?

35. Vamos hablar de la gente en Cuba ahora -- Si un nuevo gobierno tomara el poder y las cosas mejoraran, cuál sería la probabilidad de que gente que Ud. conoce -- amigos, parientes -- quisieran venir a E.U. a vivir? Ud. diría que es muy probable, algo probable, no muy probable o improbable?

35. And what about people in Cuba now--if a new government came to power and things got better, how likely is that people you know about, relatives and friends, would come to live in the United States - would you say very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

Frequencies

35. If new government would more people come to US

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*VERY LIKELY*	182	15.2	16.1	16.1
	SOMEWHAT LIKELY	223	18.6	19.8	35.9
	NOT VERY LIKELY	288	24.0	25.6	61.5
	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	434	36.2	38.5	100.0
	Total	1127	93.9	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.*	73	6.1		
	Total	73	6.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

Frequencies

35. If new government would more people come to US

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*unlikely*	722	60.2	64.1	64.1
	likely	405	33.8	35.9	100.0
	Total	1127	93.9	100.0	
Missing	*missing*	73	6.1		
	Total	73	6.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

If new government would more people come to US

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
35. If new government would more people come to US	*unlikely*	69%	60%	64%	65%	45%	59%	71%	74%
	likely	31%	40%	36%	35%	55%	41%	29%	26%

Tables

If new government would more people come to US

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-19
35. If new government would more people come to US	*unlikely*	57%	69%	73%	61%	77%	70%	63%	66%	59
	likely	43%	31%	27%	39%	23%	30%	37%	34%	41

Tables

If new government would more people come to US

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
35. If new government would more people come to US	*unlikely*	63%	66%	64%	71%	65%	65%	59%
	likely	37%	34%	36%	29%	35%	35%	41%

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36. How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans

36. Recientemente el gobierno de los EE.UU. ha propuesto deportar a un gran número de nicaragüenses que han vivido en el condado de Dade por muchos años. Está de acuerdo con esta política o en desacuerdo?

36. Recently the U.S. government has proposed to deport a large number of Nicaraguans who have lived in Dade County for a number of years. Do you agree or disagree with this?

Frequencies

36. How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*AGREE*	131	10.9	12.0	12.0
	DISAGREE	962	80.2	88.0	100.0
	Total	1093	91.1	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.*	107	8.9		
	Total	107	8.9		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
36. How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans?	*AGREE*	12%	12%	12%	12%	15%	14%	11%	9%
	DISAGREE	88%	88%	88%	88%	85%	86%	89%	91%

Tables

How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1
36. How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans?	*AGREE*	15%	10%	8%	13%	14%	11%	12%	11%	
	DISAGREE	85%	90%	92%	87%	86%	89%	88%	89%	

Tables

How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
36. How feel about decision to deport Nicaraguans?	*AGREE*	14%	8%	12%	5%	10%	11%	18%
	DISAGREE	86%	92%	88%	95%	90%	89%	82%

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50. Are you a U.S. citizen?

50. Es Ud. ciudadano de los EE.UU.?

50. Are you a U.S. citizen?

Frequencies

50. Are you a U.S. citizen?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*citizen*	809	67.4	68.2	68.2
	not citizen	377	31.4	31.8	100.0
	Total	1186	98.8	100.0	
Missing	*9.00*	14	1.2		
	Total	14	1.2		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Are you a U.S. citizen

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
50. Are you a U.S. citizen?	*citizen*	72%	65%	68%	68%	66%	63%	65%	79%
	not citizen	28%	35%	32%	32%	34%	37%	35%	21%

Tables

Are you a U.S. citizen

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997
50. Are you a U.S. citizen?	*citizen*	68%	68%	52%	74%	89%	90%	78%	41%	2%
	not citizen	32%	32%	48%	26%	11%	10%	22%	59%	98%

Tables

Are you a U.S. citizen

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
50. Are you a U.S. citizen?	*citizen*	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	not citizen		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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51. Are you registered to vote?

51. Está Ud. inscrito para votar en la Florida?

51. Are you registered to vote?

Frequencies

51. Are you registered to vote?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*YES.*	741	61.8	91.8	91.8
	NO [SKIP TO 53]	66	5.5	8.2	100.0
	Total	807	67.3	100.0	
Missing	*.00*	389	32.4		
	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE.	4	.3		
	Total	393	32.8		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Are you registered to vote

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
51. Are you registered to vote?	*YES.*	94%	90%	92%	93%	83%	93%	92%	95%
	NO [SKIP TO 53]	6%	10%	8%	7%	17%	7%	8%	5%

Tables

Are you registered to vote

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1997
51. Are you registered to vote?	*YES.*	92%	92%	89%	92%	95%	95%	89%	81%	50%
	NO [SKIP TO 53]	8%	8%	11%	8%	5%	5%	11%	19%	50%

Tables

Are you registered to vote

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
51. Are you registered to vote?	*YES.*	92%	50%	92%	93%	91%	93%	94%
	NO [SKIP TO 53]	8%	50%	8%	7%	9%	7%	6%

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52. Political party

52. Está inscrito para votar como Republicano, Demócrata o como Independiente?

52. Are you registered as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?

Frequencies

52. Political party?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*REPUBLICAN*	500	41.7	69.5	69.5
	DEMOCRAT	117	9.8	16.3	85.8
	INDEPENDENT	102	8.5	14.2	100.0
	Total	719	59.9	100.0	
Missing	*.00*	457	38.1		
	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	24	2.0		
	Total	481	40.1		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Political party

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
52. Political party?	*REPUBLICAN*	73%	65%	70%	70%	57%	69%	74%	72%
	DEMOCRAT	13%	20%	17%	13%	24%	14%	19%	12%
	INDEPENDENT	14%	15%	14%	17%	20%	17%	8%	16%

Tables

Political party

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	19
52. Political party?	*REPUBLICAN*	67%	72%	78%	68%	67%	74%	70%	77%	
	DEMOCRAT	18%	15%	14%	17%	20%	15%	11%	15%	
	INDEPENDENT	15%	14%	9%	16%	13%	12%	19%	8%	

Tables

Political party

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
52. Political party?	*REPUBLICAN*	69%	100%	72%	55%	68%	67%	71%
	DEMOCRAT	16%		15%	31%	18%	17%	15%
	INDEPENDENT	14%		14%	14%	14%	16%	14%

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55. Presidential vote

55. Y [un|dos] pregunta[s] más sobre temas políticos: Me puede decir si votó por Bob Dole o Bill Clinton en la última elección en Noviembre pasado, o si no votó?

55. Finally, I have a [couple of] question[s] on political issues: [IF REGISTERED TO VOTE] Could you tell me whether you voted for Bob Dole or Bill Clinton in the election for president last November, or did you not vote?

Frequencies

55. Presidential vote?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*DOLE*	366	30.5	51.3	51.3
	CLINTON	239	19.9	33.5	84.9
	OTHER	108	9.0	15.1	100.0
	Total	713	59.4	100.0	
Missing	*.00*	459	38.3		
	DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE	28	2.3		
	Total	487	40.6		
Total		1200	100.0		

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Presidential vote

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
55. Presidential vote?	*DOLE*	70%	49%	59%	65%	42%	50%	64%	73%
	CLINTON	30%	51%	41%	35%	58%	50%	36%	27%

Tables

Presidential vote

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you leave Cuba?				
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990
55. Presidential vote?	*DOLE*	61%	60%	72%	58%	56%	69%	63%	54%	
	CLINTON	39%	40%	28%	42%	44%	31%	37%	46%	1

Tables

Presidential vote

		race		income		
		White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
55. Presidential vote?	*DOLE*	62%	44%	68%	56%	57%
	CLINTON	38%	56%	32%	44%	43%

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56. Immigration/welfare changes necessary

56. Los recientes cambios en las leyes de inmigración y de bienestar social pueden resultar en que muchas personas que son residentes legales pierdan los beneficios que han estado recibiendo del gobierno. En general, cree Ud. que estos cambios a las leyes eran necesarios o no?

56. Recent changes in immigration and welfare laws may result in many legal residents losing government benefits. Overall, do think these changes were necessary or not?

Frequencies

56. Immigration/welfare changes necessary?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	*NECESSARY*	396	33.0	35.6	35.6
	NOT NECESSARY	616	51.3	55.4	91.0
	WELFARE CHANGE OK, IMMIGRATION TOO FAR	45	3.8	4.0	95.1
	IMMIGRATION CHANGE OK, WELFARE TOO FAR	55	4.6	4.9	100.0
	Total	1112	92.7	100.0	
Missing	*DON'T KNOW/NO RESPONSE*	88	7.3		
	Total	88	7.3		
Total		1200	100.0		

Tables

Immigration/welfare changes necessary

		7. Establish national dialogue?		9. Overall how well has embargo worked?		Age			
		oppose	favor	not well	well	18-29	30-44	45-64	65 and older
56. Immigration/welfare changes necessary?	*NECESSARY*	37%	35%	36%	36%	39%	39%	34%	33%
	NOT NECESSARY	54%	56%	55%	56%	56%	52%	57%	55%
	WELFARE CHANGE OK, IMMIGRATION TOO FAR	3%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	3%	5%
	IMMIGRATION CHANGE OK, WELFARE TOO FAR	6%	3%	6%	3%	1%	4%	6%	7%

Tables

Immigration/welfare changes necessary

		Gender of respondent		high school graduate		39. In what year did you lea			
		MALE	FEMALE	less than HS	HS or more	1959 or before	1960-1969	1970-1979	19
56. Immigration/welfare changes necessary?	*NECESSARY*	39%	34%	31%	38%	44%	36%	30%	
	NOT NECESSARY	52%	57%	60%	53%	44%	55%	62%	
	WELFARE CHANGE OK, IMMIGRATION TOO FAR	4%	4%	3%	4%	7%	5%	2%	
	IMMIGRATION CHANGE OK, WELFARE TOO FAR	5%	5%	6%	5%	5%	4%	6%	

Tables

Immigration/welfare changes necessary

		50. Are you a U.S. citizen?		race		income		
		citizen	not citizen	White	Black or Mulatto	under $20,000	$20-50,000	over $50,000
56. Immigration/welfare changes necessary?	*NECESSARY*	38%	32%	35%	35%	35%	37%	43%
	NOT NECESSARY	53%	60%	56%	60%	55%	53%	51%
	WELFARE CHANGE OK, IMMIGRATION TOO FAR	5%	3%	4%	2%	4%	5%	4%
	IMMIGRATION CHANGE OK, WELFARE TOO FAR	4%	6%	5%	2%	5%	6%	2%

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Revised July 21, 1997 by Hugh Gladwin